Allman in the U.S.'s First 'Wartime Agency' to 'Collect Secret Intelligence […] by Means of Espionage‘

As the chief and initial hire of the OSS's Far Eastern Secret Intelligence desk, Allman helped launch the United States' first "wartime agency" created to "collect secret intelligence […] by means of espionage and counterespionage, and evaluate and disseminate such intelligence to authorized agencies." In a letter to his friend George Sokolsky, Allman joked that he was busy writing his own job description. In reality, though, the Shanghai lawyer was using his new role to promote his Third Force political views. But Allman was worried: The new agency lacked personnel, organization, and a shared touchstone that would help him succeed.

Allman complained to his boss William J. Donovan, the agency's director, that the OSS "was too new for the task at hand." The agency, he believed, needed to tap into an existing infrastructure that allowed easier access to sources and acted as a role model for intelligence officers. As he wrote in an early OSS memorandum, the agency was starting from scratch, and there were "not a great number of Americans in the United States who have the necessary experience and language qualifications." Intelligence work, Allman pointed out, required more than a roomful of young cadets with two years of language training in Beijing. Allman also wanted the agency to have an overarching modus operandi that was somehow tied to the tenets of the Third Force. Mere marching orders, along the lines of "defeat the Japanese," he explained, would not be enough.

In typical Allman fashion, his questions and concerns came with answers. He suggested to Donovan and General John Magruder, deputy director of the Secret Intelligence branch, that the organization follow the lead of the British in intelligence gathering and work with his friend and fellow newspaper owner Cornelius V. Starr, a long-time Shanghai resident who founded and ran the American International Group (AIG), as well as Da Mei Wan Bao and the Shanghai Evening News and Mercury in China. Conveniently, Starr was already known to Donovan, as he had recommended Allman to him as an intelligence officer. But perhaps more conveniently, Starr already worked in espionage with the British and was a well-known proponent of the Third Force, having worked in the newspaper industry alongside Shen Bao editors and writers (most notably Shi Liangcai).

Starr ran an "ambitious" "private espionage ring" called the "Counter Japanese Division of COI," or Center of Information in Shanghai. How formally Starr's COI was tied to the U.S. government's agency of the same abbreviation (referred to as the Office of the Coordinator of Information and run by Donovan) is unknown, but the goals and efforts of the organizations clearly overlapped and flowed into Allman's early intelligence work and efforts to promote the Third Force. It is also quite possible that Allman dabbled in Starr's COI outfit prior to his internment with the Japanese.

Donovan openly associated with Starr, and both men consulted British intelligence officials prior to launching their COI agencies. Together, Starr and Donovan would greatly influence Allman's intelligence work and his political views. After several trips to London, Donovan returned with an "admiration for British commando units" and a conviction that "there was a place for aggressive, small mobile forces which might greatly increase the enemy's misery and weaken his will to resist." Donovan, working with Allman, modeled the OSS on much of what he saw in London and elsewhere in Britain. For Allman, this was ideal, as — in his view — the British clearly promoted the principles and approach of the Third Force. Both Allman and Donovan worked to establish direct ties with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and Special Operations Executive (SOE), and they maintained these relationships after the shuttering of the OSS in 1945.

In today's document, we see the banal from this time frame: Allman's reimbursement for $28 in "entertainment" from the OSS, a document classified by the CIA until November 1987, nine months after Allman died.

Sources:

Albert C. Wedemeyer. "Joint Chief of Staff Directive Functions of the Office of Strategic Services," Box 80, File 1, Hoover Institution Archives; editor. "Preface," Central Intelligence Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, posted March 7, 2007 [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/directors-and-deputy-directors-of-central-intelligence/preface.html. Accessed February 21, 2010.].

Albert C. Wedemeyer. "Joint Chief of Staff Directive Functions of the Office of Strategic Services," Box 80, File 1, Hoover Institution Archives; Caldwell Secret xviii-xix.

Albert C. Wedemeyer. "Joint Chief of Staff Directive Functions of the Office of Strategic Services," Box 80, File 1, Hoover Institution Archives; editor. "Preface," Central Intelligence Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, posted March 7, 2007 [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/directors-and-deputy-directors-of-central-intelligence/preface.html. Accessed February 21, 2010.]; Norwood F. Allman Papers. "Shun Pao," Box 22, File 29, Hoover Institution Archives; J. Arthur Duff Papers, "Bibliographical file," Box 1, File 2, Hoover Institution Archives; Yu OSS in China 60, 12.